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Articles
Assisted Reproductive Technology and
the Family
by
JoHN A. ROBERTSON*
More than one in eight married couples in the United States suf-
fer from infertility (defined as a lack of pregnancy after a year of un-
protected intercourse).' Although some couples adopt or choose to
remain childless, many turn to physicians for help in forming families.
The list of assisted reproductive techniques (ARTs) available for
treating infertility now includes intrauterine insemination (IUI), ovu-
lation induction, in vitro fertilization (IVF), intracytoplasmic sperm
injection, sperm donation, egg donation, embryo donation, and gesta-
tional surrogacy.
The growth of the contemporary infertility industry has been
largely spurred by the development of IVF. The first American birth
resulting from in vitro fertilization occurred in 1981.2 By 1988, 15,000
stimulated IVF cycles occurred in more than 100 clinics. In 1994,
more than 300 clinics performed more than 35,000 cycles, resulting in
more than 6,000 births.3 More than 200 programs now provide donor
eggs, and thousands of obstetricians and gynecologists provide IUI,
donor sperm, and ovulation induction in office settings. Twenty to
* Vinson & Elkins Chair and Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School
of Law.
1. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTirrY: MEDICAL
AND SociAL CHoICEs 3 (1988).
2. That child, Judith Carr, was recently featured in a front-page story in the New
York Times. Elisabeth Rosenthal, From Lives Begun in a Lab, Brave New Joy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at Al, B7.
3. Society for Assisted Reproduction, American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and Canada: 1993 Results Generated
from the American Society for Reproductive MedicinelSociety for Assisted Reproductive
Technology Registry, 64 FERTrrY & STEmLrry 1121, 1121-27 (1995) (author's extrapola-
tion from figures in 1993 registry) [hereinafter Society for Assisted Reproduction].
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thirty thousand children are born each year as a result of these tech-
niques, with the vast majority of them produced by artificial insemina-
tion with partner or donor sperm.4
Assisted reproductive techniques-the focus of this paper-have
become available on a widespread basis in the last decade. Other re-
productive technologies include preconception screening for carriers
of autosomal recessive genetic disease, and prenatal screening of em-
bryos and fetuses to prevent the birth of handicapped or diseased off-
spring. Technologies are also available to identify and treat problems
in fetuses in utero, enabling offspring to be born reasonably healthy.
In the future, genetic selection for sex or other characteristics, and
even preimplantation genetic enhancement of offspring traits, may be
possible.5
The use of assisted reproductive techniques by infertile couples is
a family-centered act, reflecting couples' desire to form families with
biologically related offspring. Although adoption and foster parenting
can provide parenting experiences, only ARTs enable one or both
partners to have some biologic tie, either genetic or gestational, to
their children. While some critics of ARTs disapprove of the empha-
sis these technologies place on genetic ties, our culture, our law, and
our social and psychological understandings of reproduction and
parenting define parental and offspring roles largely though not exclu-
sively in genetic or biologic terms. In this context, the development of
safe and effective ARTs appears to be positive: it reduces the suffer-
ing of childless couples by making it possible for them to realize their
procreative goals.
Yet many people have doubts about ARTs and the industry that
has grown up around them. Some of these doubts concern the moral-
ity and consequences of interfering with nature or manipulating the
earliest stages of life. Others focus on the consequences for offspring,
for participants (including the couples directly involved and the col-
laborating donors and surrogates), and for women and families gener-
ally.6 Some have criticized the industry's emphasis on profits and its
lack of regulation-which has recently received considerable attention
4. The number of IVF deliveries in 1993 for IVF, GIFT (gamete intrafallopian trans-
fer), ZIFT (zygote intrafallopian transfer), and frozen embryo transfers was 7,456. Egg
donation added another 716 births. Society for Assisted Reproduction, supra note 3, at
1121. There are no figures on the number of children born by IUI or ovulation induction.
5. John A. Robertson, Prebirth Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L.
REv. (forthcoming June 1996).
6. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
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because of allegations of the theft of eggs and embryos by leading
doctors at a California fertility center.7
This paper will address policy issues arising from the use of ARTs
to help infertile couples form families. My basic premise is that ARTs
support the traditional notion of the family, even though they depart
from the conventional method of producing children through coital
conception. Despite the differences in the method of conception, the
goal of an ART is a child biologically related to one or both rearing
parents-a goal similar to that sought through coital conception. The
family project in each case should be treated equally. The use of gam-
ete donors and surrogates, however, requires special attention be-
cause of the potential problems that the resulting disaggregation of
the genetic, gestational, and social aspects of procreation pose for par-
ticipants and offspring.
Rather than prohibit or discourage their use, the main thrust of
public policy toward ARTs should be to assure that they are used with
care and attention to the needs and interests of all parties. Such a
strategy typically arises after some experience with an emerging tech-
nology. To be successful, it requires a close, contextual understanding
of the field, so that problems can be identified and corrected. As dis-
cussed below, the main policy issues with ARTs revolve around medi-
cal efficacy, access to ART services, legal infrastructure, and
regulation. I will focus on issues of legal infrastructure and regulation,
and discuss how the growing use of ARTs may or may not alter con-
ceptions of the family as we approach the dawn of a new century.
I. ARTs, Freedom, and the Family
Before addressing current policy issues, it is useful to consider
briefly the connection between the use of ARTs and personal and pro-
creative liberty. Critics of ARTs have often called for prohibition or
regulation without realizing the impact such restrictions would have
on procreative freedom, a freedom that is highly valued in other con-
texts.8 Yet the right of infertile couples to use these techniques is as
important as their right to conceive coitally or to avoid reproduction
once pregnancy has occurred. The argument in support of the rights
7. Diane M. Gianelli, Fertility Scandal Raises Call for Regulation, AM. MED. NEws,
Sept. 11, 1995, at 1.
8. In questioning the lengths to which some persons go to have offspring, critics do
not usually distinguish carefully among techniques, nor reconcile their willingness to re-
strict some ARTs with their strong defense of freedom with regard to coital reproduction,
contraception, and abortion.
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of infertile couples to use ARTs to form families can be briefly
stated.9
Although it is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution, courts
would no doubt recognize as fundamental the right of a married
couple to reproduce coitally, because of the traditional association of
reproduction and childrearing with marriage, and the independent im-
portance of reproduction in people's lives. Since an infertile couple or
individual has the same interest in bearing and rearing offspring as a
fertile couples does, their right to use noncoital techniques to treat
infertility should have equivalent respect. This is clearest when the
couple's own gametes will be involved, such as IUI and IVF, but it
should also be recognized when one partner does not contribute ge-
netically or gestationally to reproduction.10 Thus laws that restrict or
prohibit access to ARTs should be judged under the same exacting
standard that would apply to direct restrictions on coital reproduc-
tion-the need to show a compelling state interest not achievable by
less restrictive means.1 Under this standard, most objections to
ARTs are insufficient to justify banning or unduly burdening their use,
though there is considerable room for reasonable regulation designed
to assure that consumers fully understand and freely choose the par-
ticular ART at issue.12
Although few direct restrictions on the use of ARTs currently ex-
ist,' 3 vigilance in maintaining the protected status of noncoital and col-
laborative means of forming families is important for two reasons.
9. I have presented this argument in several articles, and most recently in the book
Children of Choice. ROBERTSON, supra note 6; see also John A. Robertson, Liberalism and
the Limits of Procreative Liberty, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 233-48 (1995).
10. The right involved may also be articulated as an instance of the right of intimate
association. Just as gays and lesbians have a legitimate claim to marry and rear offspring
under theories of family privacy and intimacy of association, Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993), so should individuals and couples have the right to collaborate with each
other and their physicians to create new forms of intimate association that produce
offspring.
11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965) (White, J.,
concurring).
12. The liberty claim is a claim of a negative right against interference by government
or others. See McRae v. Harris, 448 U.S. 297, 314-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
473-74 (1977). The question of the extent to which such an important negative right
should be funded or supported by the state is an important one, but beyond the scope of
this article. See Dan Brock, Funding New Reproductive Technologies: Should They Be
Included in a Basic Benefit Package?, in NEw WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF
EGG DONATION (Cynthia Cohen ed., forthcoming 1996).
13. The exception is surrogacy. New York, for example, makes it a crime to pay a
woman to be a surrogate or an agent who arranges surrogacy. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 123(1) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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First, we should be mindful of the personal importance of the interests
that are at stake for couples using ARTs, and the need to be prudent
and moderate with regulation. The infertile couple's quest for chil-
dren is normal and natural, and their resort to medical assistance is a
reasonable response in a technologically oriented culture. Second,
legal, policy, or professional restrictions should be imposed only for
good reason, as they may prevent couples from obtaining such serv-
ices. As long as the ARTs in question are not causing tangible harm
to others, medical professionals should be free to provide them.
However, the liberty to procreate is only presumptive, and thus
can be limited when it causes great harm. Fundamental rights are not
absolute, but a heavy burden of justification is placed upon those who
would restrict them.14 Although the protected status of ARTs greatly
limits the state's power to ban a technique, it leaves room for regula-
tory measures that guide and discourage, rather than coerce and pro-
hibit. There is, for example, room for regulatory efforts that aim to
enhance and protect autonomy, rather than to restrict it totally. The
liberal state does not lack the power to instill virtue-it need only
respect rights in doing so.
In a regime of reproductive rights, there is room for both state
and private actors to express their own moral views about reproduc-
tive choice or to take steps to minimize perceived harm. Doctors can
choose not to perform these procedures, or to perform them only in a
pro-life way, as illustrated by the Christian gynecologist who prays
with his patients before both egg retrieval and embryo transfer.15
They can personally set limits on which procedures they are willing to
perform; for example, refusing to transfer more than three embryos,
to discard embryos, or to use donor gametes. The state may choose
not to fund ART procedures, even though there are sound arguments
for increasing access.' 6 Although the absence of legal guidance may
cause problems for couples using these procedures, the state could
also refuse to provide the legal infrastructure that is required for the
efficient use of these procedures.'1 At the very least, the state could
ensure autonomy for participants, ratify and authorize the agreements
made with donors and surrogates, gather statistics, and certify and li-
cense laboratories and providers.
14. The classic statement of this position is found in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
15. Christine Lehmann, Questions of Infertility: Many Couples Face Tangle of Ethical
Concerns, DALLAs MORNING NEws, Nov. 25, 1995, at 16.
16. See generally Brock, supra note 12.
17. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 261-62.
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The key policy and regulatory issues are: What practices are un-
ethical or undesirable, and what actions should be taken to stop them?
These issues will vary with the type of medical assistance sought, and
may change over time as patients become better informed, as medical
technology progresses, and as ethical standards of care emerge. Dif-
ferent issues will arise depending on whether the couple provides the
gametes and gestation, or seeks the assistance of a gamete donor or
surrogate.
Although ARTs that use the couple's gametes avoid conflicts
over rearing rights and duties, they still present issues concerning in-
trusions into the body, high costs, and the manipulation, transfer, and
destruction of embryos. The main policy concerns for this category of
ARTs will focus on ensuring that the services are provided in an hon-
est, safe, and effective manner, and that the couple's dispositional con-
trol over their gametes and embryos is respected.
ARTs that use gamete or embryo donors or gestational carriers
raise additional issues because they include a third party in the effort
to reproduce. Because these practices pose risks for both donors and
surrogates, they require clear legal understandings of rearing rights
and duties. They also raise questions about whether and in what man-
ner the children they produce should be informed about the nature of
their conception. As discussed in the concluding section, the implica-
tions of such practices for altering conceptions of family are less radi-
cal than they might first appear to be.
H. Policy Issues with IVF
The use of IVF to treat infertility raises policy issues that can be
categorized under the headings of efficacy, access, legal infrastructure,
and regulation. Questions of medical efficacy concern how to im-
prove laboratory and medical procedures so that more women have
successful outcomes-questions that are beyond the scope of this pa-
per.18 Questions of access raise important issues of social justice in
the allocation of medical resources and reproductive opportunities,
18. Several issues exist here: stimulated verses nonstimulated or gently stimulated
cycles; limits on the number of embryos to transfer, except in older women; selective re-
duction and attempts to stop it; high rate of multiplets; etc. See generally John A. Collins,
Reproductive Technology-The Price of Progress, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 270, 270-71
(1994).
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and are also beyond the scope of this essay.19 I will focus instead on
issues of legal infrastructure and regulation.
A. Legal Infrastructure
A workable system of assisted reproduction through IVF requires
a clear legal system of rules and laws for disposition of gametes and
embryos acquired or created in the IVF process. Although only a few
cases have directly confronted the issue, a legal presumption has
emerged that the persons providing the gametes for the embryos cre-
ated through IVF have dispositional control over, or "own," the re-
sulting embryos.2o This rule has given rise to two kinds of legal issues
concerning ownership of embryos:
One issue involves disputes over disposition of embryos between
the parties who provided the gametes from which the embryos were
formed. Although they are joint owners and have joint dispositional
control over embryos vis-ii-vis the IVF center's physicians and staff,
difficult questions arise when they disagree over the use or disposition
of embryos. Such situations arise most frequently when couples di-
vorce or separate, and cannot agree whether to use or discard their
stored embryos. In these situations, one party's interest in avoiding
procreation may clash with the other party's interest in using the em-
bryos to procreate.
To minimize such conflicts couples should specify in advance their
wishes concerning disposition of embryos in case of divorce, separa-
tion, unavailability, or inability to agree at a later time about disposi-
tion. Indeed, it is customary for IVF programs to request that couples
state their wishes concerning disposition prior to freezing. Jointly
agreed-upon written directions for disposition of embryos are likely to
be legally recognized, even if one party later changes his or her mind
and wishes a different disposition.21
Difficult questions arise in disputes over the disposition of em-
bryos and gametes when no advance agreement exists. In each of the
two reported cases that confront this issue, the wife wanted to save the
19. One study estimates the average costs of obtaining a child through IVF to be
$66,000. Peter J. Neumann et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery with In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion, 331 NE w ENG. J. MED. 239, 239-43 (1994). Dan Brock has made the argument best
for funding IVF as part of health insurance. See generally Brock, supra note 12.
20. John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA.
L. REv. 437, 454-63 (1990).
21. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597, 604 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911
(1993); John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 Omo
ST. L.J. 407, 424 (1990).
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embryos, and the husband wanted them destroyed. In one of them,
Davis v. Davis,22 the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the party
wanting to avoid reproduction should control disposition of the em-
bryos, unless the other party has no other reasonable way of repro-
ducing without the embryos in question. In the other case, Kass v.
Kass,23 a New York state trial court analogized the situation to a wo-
man's right to control the product of in vivo conception, and held for
the woman.
At one level it may not matter what the default rule is, as long as
it is clear and the parties are given advance notice of it. A rule that
says that embryos must be saved whenever the woman so insists can
be justified in terms of the greater burdens undergone by the woman
to produce the embryos. On the other hand, a rule that says that em-
bryos should not be transferred to either party unless both parties
agree is also reasonable, since such a transfer could lead to unwanted
parenthood for the dissenting party. Clear notice of the applicable
rule will inform couples of the consequences of freezing embryos, and
permit them to negotiate an alternative solution.
Another legal issue about control of embryos can arise between
the couple and the IVF program. Here the issue is not the recognition
of the couple's ownership and dispositional authority, but rather how
to devise remedies for interference with that ownership. Consider the
case, for example, in which the couple's embryos are negligently de-
stroyed or inadvertently given to another couple. The owners have
lost or been deprived of valuable property, and should be compen-
sated. But what value should be assigned to embryos in those circum-
stances? The cost of production allocated equally among the number
of embryos produced? Would this be enough to support a suit to re-
cover damages? Would it adequately cover the loss sustained?
Should liquidated damages be agreed upon? What about cases in
which a program has failed to hear from the owners of the frozen
embryos for five years or more, has no way of contacting them, and
discards the embryos?
In addition to the question of compensation, questions of crimi-
nal liability for the intentional misappropriation of gametes or em-
bryos may also arise. The scandal involving fertility doctors at the
University of California at Irvine (UCI) shows that this concern is not
merely theoretical. Dr. Ricardo Asch and colleagues who ran the IVF
22. 842 S.W.2d at 604.
23. Kass v. Kass, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1995, at 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995).
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program at UCI were alleged to have intentionally taken the eggs and
embryos of women and couples without their consent, and used them
to initiate pregnancy with other couples.24 While most of the atten-
tion has focused on UCI's alleged dereliction in allowing this situation
to continue, and on compensation for the injured couples, the ques-
tion of criminal liability for theft of eggs and embryos is also relevant.
Since eggs and embryos would appear to be things of value, there
is no barrier in principle to applying theft and larceny laws to their
misappropriation. The district attorney, however, has refused to pros-
ecute because of uncertainty whether the value of the stolen eggs and
embryos meets the $1,000 threshold requirement for a felony theft
prosecution.25 Statutes making intentional misappropriation or mis-
representation of gametes and embryos a felony could avoid this
problem, and should be an essential part of the legal infrastructure for
conducting IVF.
B. Regulation
A major current policy issue in the provision of IVF is whether
greater public regulation is needed. IVF services are now regulated
like other medical procedures-there is little regulation other than
medical licensure, malpractice, and specialty certification. Just as any
licensed doctor is legally permitted to perform any medical procedure,
any doctor can also provide infertility services without any specific
certification if he or she attracts patients and has access to surgical
suites for egg retrieval.
In the late 1980s, the practice of some IVF programs of exagger-
ating their success rates led to Federal Trade Commission actions
against them for false advertising.26 Such practices also spawned con-
gressional hearings, and eventually led to the passage of the Fertility
Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992.27 The purpose of
the Act was to have the Centers for Disease Control collect data con-
cerning clinic-specific success rates, which would then be made avail-
able to patients for selecting clinics. It was also hoped that by
certifying laboratory procedures and practices (on which much of the
efficacy of IVF depends), pregnancy rates would improve.
24. See John A. Robertson, The Case of the Switched Embryos, HASTINGS CENTER
REPoRT, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 13, for an account of this case and some of the issues raised.
25. Id.
26. Robert Pear, Fertility Clinics Face Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992, at A15.
27. Pub. L. No. 102-493, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3146.
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Although the federal government has yet to fund implementation
of the 1992 Act, considerable progress has been made by the profes-
sion itself. The American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM), together with the Society for Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology (SART), have operated a registry of data concerning success
rates for many years.28 ASRM, together with the College of Ameri-
can Pathology (CAP), have also conducted voluntary laboratory certi-
fication procedures, as the 1992 law envisages. 29
The publicity surrounding the allegations of stolen eggs and em-
bryos at UCI has spurred further talk about regulation. Many com-
mentators have reacted to the scandal by focusing on the unregulated
nature of the IVF system, implying that more regulation could have
prevented such actions. Some critics have recommended that the
United States adopt the British regulatory system, in which a national
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) licenses and
inspects every IVF program on an annual basis.30 Indeed, the ASRM
has announced that it is amenable to such an approach.31
I am skeptical about the need for a British-style regulatory
agency for IVF or for assisted reproduction generally. A generation
of law and economics study has reminded us how costly and inefficient
"throwing an agency" at a problem can be. Among other problems,
regulatory agencies can have protectionist effects that make the entry
of competitors more difficult. In any event, the antigovernment bias
prevalent in contemporary national politics and the tight budgets pre-
vailing in Washington make the creation of a new federal agency to
regulate IVF extremely unlikely. Nor are states equipped to take on
the job, although one or two might attempt it. Additional private ef-
forts might occur, or a consortium of university programs might devise
standards, as has occurred in California.32
My skepticism about the likelihood that an IVF regulatory
agency will be created is based on a prediction that the costs of such
an approach are likely to outweigh the benefits. There is no guaran-
tee, for example, that annual inspections and licensure will increase
the efficacy of IVF overall, or even in specific programs (it may be
28. See sources cited supra note 3.
29. Pub. L. No. 102-493, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3146.
30. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (U.K.).
31. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Statement on Regulation of ART
(Nov. 17, 1995) (unpublished press release, on file with the author).
32. Office of the President, University of California, Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogy: A Systemwide Task Force Report and Recommendations to Strengthen Oversight
and Improve Quality of Care (Mar. 1996) (unpublished report, on file with the author).
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that the number of patients treated by a particular program is the key
factor). Nor will annual inspections necessarily prevent unscrupulous
practitioners from stealing gametes and embryos or defrauding pa-
tients. Yet such a system would be costly, and the costs would ulti-
mately be passed on to patients. Ironically, regulation intended to
protect patients could end up making the procedure too costly for
many patients to obtain.
Many of the desired protections could be provided without a
costly new regulatory system. The current system of malpractice law,
medical licensure, and professional standards, despite its defects, al-
ready provides some incentives to assure good, quality care, and it can
easily be modified to provide more. For example, the existing ASRM-
SART registry of clinic-specific outcomes already gives patients con-
siderable information about the programs available. Malpractice,
property, and informed consent law already protects against gross
abuse. Various groups, from the ASRM to the National Advisory
Board for Ethics in Reproduction, have devised ethical guidelines for
doctors delivering these services. As patients become better informed
about the chances of success and the differences among programs, the
case for a new regulatory system weakens further. Indeed, it is hard
to argue for a special regulatory system for IVF and assisted reproduc-
tion when procedures that present a much greater threat of harm to
patients, such as laparoscopic cholecystectomy, radial keratotomy, and
autologous bone marrow transplant, go unregulated.
In sum, the current system of IW is highly supportive of the fam-
ily because it provides infertile couples with a means to have biologic
offspring who would not otherwise be born. An important concern
for couples undergoing IVF is obtaining safe and effective treatments
and accurate information about their prospects. Public policies that
enhance access and efficacy, create legal infrastructure, and regulate
appropriately are supportive of the family interests that IVF serves.
Ill. Donors and Surrogates
Assisted reproductive techniques involving donors and surrogates
raise additional issues because of the complications engendered by
third-party contributors to family formation. Although issues of effi-
cacy and access arise here as well, I will again focus only on legal in-
frastructure and regulation.33
33. With regard to efficacy, egg donation has a higher success rate than basic IVF for
persons who need it, due to the generally better quality of eggs provided by donors. Mark
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A. Legal Infrastructure
The main issue with donors and surrogates is the need for a legal
infrastructure that clarifies the legal effects of participation in such
practices. Such an infrastructure now exists with donor sperm. More
than thirty states have statutes that give legal recognition to the par-
ties' intent that the recipient couple will take responsibility for all
rearing rights and duties, and that the donor will relinquish them.34
Several other states have court decisions that reach the same result.35
Although there is less legal certainty for sperm donations to single
women and lesbian couples, there is enough precedent to give them at
least some guidance.
(1) Egg and Embryo Donation
Legal infrastructure for egg and embryo donation is an entirely
different matter. Although more than 150 IVF programs now provide
egg donation, resulting in 500 births annually, only six states have stat-
utes recognizing the intended legal effects of the transaction.3 6 Em-
bryo donation is currently practiced on a much smaller scale than
sperm donation, but it could grow in the future. Only two states now
give explicit legal recognition to the parties' intent in embryo dona-
tion to have the recipient couple acquire all rearing rights and
duties.37
Sauer & Richard Paulson, Understanding the Current Status of Oocyte Donation in the
United States: What's Really Going On Out There?, 58 FERTILrY & STERILrrY 16, 17
(1992). Access is a more difficult issue, because the use of an egg donor or gestational
carrier increases the costs of a cycle of treatment significantly. However, if one believes
that infertility treatments should be covered as part of basic health insurance, then one
could argue that donor and surrogate assistance in reproduction should be covered as well.
34. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, supra note 1, at 242-48.
35. See, e.g., People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (husband who
consents to donor insemination of wife is liable for child support); K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (stating that a husband who consents to artificial insemina-
tion takes on the obligation to support the child); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that a child conceived through artificial insemination of the wife
through the use, with the husband's consent, of semen contributed by a donor other than
the husband was not the legitimate issue of the husband, but that the husband was liable
for the support of the child); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 878 (S.C. 1987) (holding that
the father of a child conceived through artificial insemination is responsible for supporting
that child, regardless whether the father gave written consent to the procedure).
36. FLA. STAT. ch. 742.14 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 555 (West Supp. 1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102 (West Supp. 1996);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 1995).
37. John A. Robertson, Ethical and Legal Issues in Human Embryo Donation, 64
FERTILITY & STERILITY 885, 891-92 (1995).
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Couples and donors involved in egg and embryo donation thus
face legal uncertainty over whether their intentions and agreements
concerning rearing rights and duties will be enforced. If custody or
child support disputes arise, it is likely that the courts will apply the
iiiderlying principle of their own state's donor sperm statutes, or ex-
isting egg and embryo donation statutes, and give legal effect to the
intent of the donor to relinquish, and the couple's intent to take on, all
rearing rights and duties.3 8 However, it would serve the interests of
all parties if legislation explicitly recognized the intent of the collabo-
rating parties.
(2) Gestational Surrogacy
Surrogacy first came to public attention with the much publicized
Baby M case in New Jersey in 1988.39 In that case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that full surrogacy contracts (under which the
surrogate provides both the egg and the gestation) are unenforceable
because they conflict with sound public policy and existing adoption
laws that prohibit enforcement of preconception or prenatal agree-
ments concerning the rearing of children.40 The Court also suggested
that any payments to the surrogate beyond actual medical expenses
violated state baby-selling statutes.41
The California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert42 reached a
very different result in a case of partial or gestational surrogacy (in
which the surrogate carries the embryo of the couple). In Calvert, the
Court explicitly recognized the preconception intention of the parties
as the deciding factor in determining whether the genetic or gesta-
tional mother would have rearing rights and duties.43 Its decision ex-
cluded the surrogate from any rearing role.44
38. See ROBERTSON, supra note 6, at 128-29.
39. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988).
40. Id. at 1240-50.
41. Id. at 1240-42.
42. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cer denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993), and cert. dismissed,
114 S. Ct. 374 (1993).
43. 851 P.2d at 782.
44. The court reached this conclusion because the Uniform Parentage Act adopted by
California permitted motherhood to be determined on genetic or gestational grounds. Id
As between the gestational and the genetic mother, the court found the that the precon-
ception intention of the parties should control. Id. at 782-83. It rejected the claim that the
rules for adoption should control the outcome, and found inadequate, or better left to the
legislature, various public policy considerations put forward as reasons for discouraging
gestational surrogacy (dehumanization of women, commodification of children, etc.). Id.
at 784-85.
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Calvert has firmed up the legal support for gestational surrogacy
and encouraged its growth.45 Gestational surrogacy is increasingly
viewed as a valid assisted reproductive modality, and is now reported
to the ASRM-SART registry. However, many legal uncertainties re-
main. The most common legislative response to surrogacy has been
the creation of laws that prohibit the enforcement of preconception
agreements.46 States without surrogacy legislation could reach the
same result through judicial interpretation of laws that prohibit the
enforcement of contracts for adoption or payments beyond medical
expenses to a birth mother to relinquish a child for adoption. Despite
the important differences between full and partial surrogacy, none of
the existing surrogacy statutes (much less state adoption laws that
could be interpreted to apply to surrogacy) distinguish the two forms
of surrogacy. As a result, couples in need of a gestational carrier have
strong incentives to seek the procedure in California, Pennsylvania, or
other states whose laws seem more hospitable to gestational carriers.
A few states are beginning to deal with the realities of surrogacy
by specifying preconception procedures for creating both types of sur-
rogate contracts. In a few states, such as New Hampshire and Vir-
ginia, the parties to a surrogate arrangement must come to court prior
to conception, explain their intentions and understandings, and, if
they are found fit and able, they are authorized to proceed. 47 In such
cases, the surrogate will be prevented from claiming the child after the
birth has occurred.
Given this mixed legal picture, in many states couples using gesta-
tional carriers face uncertainty about who will have parenting rights
and duties. Since these reproductive practices will continue to occur
regardless of the existence of a statute, the best solution would be to
give formal legal recognition to the preconception understandings and
intentions of the parties. However, many people might oppose the
creation of a legal infrastructure recognizing gestational surrogacy as
too encouraging or facilitative of a method of family formation which
they find objectionable. Proponents of surrogacy, on the other hand,
45. Couples using gestational surrogacy usually involve women who have functioning
ovaries but lack a uterus or for other reasons cannot carry a pregnancy to term.
46. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (1995);
IND. CODE § 31-8-2-2 (1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2713 (West 1995); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 225-21.200 (1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
18-05 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ArN. § 26.26.240
(West 1996).
47. N.H. REv. STAT. ANNm4. §§ 168-B:20, 168-B:21 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160
(Michie 1995).
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would argue that the benefits of prior legal certainty outweigh any
imprimatur effect that such legal recognition carries.
B. Regulation
With regard to donors and surrogates, the main purpose of regu-
lation, beyond the legal recognition of the intent of the parties, is to
assure that third-party collaborators are informed and protected in the
process. Although this does not require a new regulatory agency or
system, it does require that attention be paid to the interests of donors
and surrogates. I want to call attention to several issues that will have
to be faced as the use of these practices increases.48
(1) Egg Donation
Most egg donors are young women recruited by advertisements
or word of mouth and paid $1,500-$2,500 for undergoing screening,
ovarian stimulation, and egg retrieval. In some cases friends or rela-
tives of the egg recipient also donate. A major ethical and policy issue
in egg donation is the protection of the donor from injury. Two kinds
of concerns arise here.
Psychologically, the donor needs to be aware that she will be re-
producing genetically, but may never have any contact with, or even
knowledge of, the resulting offspring. It may be that female genetic
reproduction without gestation-the hallmark of egg donation-will
not be as significant as when both are combined in the same woman.
However, given the importance of genes in our culture, it is likely that
the female genetic connection, though divorced from gestation, will
still carry great psychological significance for donors, recipients, and
offspring. Donors need to be counseled about the loss of future con-
nections with their genetic offspring, and informed about the legal
rights they are relinquishing. Furthermore, donors should be coun-
seled by someone other than the doctor or the person recruiting them,
such as an experienced and disinterested mental health professional,
so that they are not unduly influenced to participate.
Donors also need to be protected against any physical injury that
might result from the donation. Although the risks of ovarian stimu-
lation and egg retrieval are tolerable, there is always the possibility
that something could go wrong and that the donor could be injured.49
Provisions should be made to ensure that the donor is fully informed
48. See ROBERTSON, supra note 6, at 139-42.
49. Hyperstimulation syndrome and anesthetic error are two risks of the egg donation
procedure.
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of these risks, and to cover the medical expenses resulting from any
injury. The standard approach is to have the recipient couple promise
to pay for medical expenses attributable to the donation. One prob-
lem with such a promise is that it might be difficult to enforce, and
could leave the donor without recourse for serious injury.50 At the
same time, such an agreement opens the recipient couple to poten-
tially large financial obligations that could arise in the rare event of
major complications. A better approach would be to have the clinics
that offer egg donation arrange for the recipient to purchase a health
insurance policy for the donor, to assure that the donor's medical ex-
penses are paid.5 1 In addition, couples and donors might agree to pay
for lost wages, though this is not now the custom.
(2) Gestational Carriers
The concerns about full information, voluntary choice, and pro-
tection from injury that arise with egg donation are even more press-
ing with surrogate gestational carriers, because of their greater
physical and psychological involvement. At the very least, surrogate
carriers need to be fully informed and counseled about the physical,
psychological, and social risks of their arrangement. They also need
independent legal representation in negotiating the surrogacy con-
tract. As discussed above in connection with egg donation, gestational
carriers should also be assured of compensation in the event of injury.
Regulations to achieve these goals would seem desirable. In designing
a regulatory system, a major decision will be whether the actual bar-
gains and understandings of the parties will be recognized, or whether
some preconception or preimplantation screening or ratifying mecha-
nisms for assessing consent, such as those now existing in New Hamp-
shire and Virginia, should be enacted. Until there is more evidence
that such mechanisms work effectively, the need for judicial screening
of surrogacy agreements remains unclear.
If the growth in gestational surrogacy continues, disputes over
prenatal testing and continuation of the pregnancy may arise between
the couple providing the embryo and the gestational carrier. Most
commentators and critics of surrogacy have argued that the surrogate
50. In an anonymous donation, the donor might never learn the identity of the recipi-
ent couple in order to obtain payment from them. Even if the recipients are known, there
is no guarantee that they will be willing or able to pay.
51. In current practice, some clinics might recruit only women who have health insur-
ance coverage of their own as donors.
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must be free to abort or not abort during pregnancy, as she chooses.52
Presumably, she should also be free to have or not have amniocentesis
or other prenatal tests.
But recognizing the legal right of a pregnant woman to abort or
not abort might not always be a fair solution to the problem
presented. Although the commissioning couple may not be legally
able to prevent her from aborting, they do have an important interest
at stake if she aborts contrary to their wishes. After all, they have
entrusted her, based on her promise, with their embryo(s), and will
suffer some damage if she aborts contrary to the agreement. Rules for
such situations, even if only contract-based, need to be developed.
Similarly, if a surrogate carrier refuses to undergo prenatal diag-
nostic procedure, such as amniocentesis, or if she refuses to terminate
a pregnancy in which the results of prenatal testing have been positive,
the consequences for the parties should be specified in advance. One
solution would be for the hiring couple (the embryo source) to relin-
quish all rearing rights and duties in the resulting offspring to the car-
rier, effectively transforming what was initially intended as a
gestational surrogacy into an embryo donation. Early attention to
such issues by persons recruiting and using surrogate carriers should
prevent lawsuits, or at least help to resolve them in a fair way.
Although it may not be appropriate to require legally that children be
informed that their birth resulted from a surrogate carrier, this is an-
other important issue that couples using these techniques must face.
IV. The Challenge to Conceptions of Family
This article has focused to this point on ways in which the provi-
sion of ART services can be improved so that the family interests they
serve can be realized in a safe and effective way. Indeed, the central
policy issue with ARTs is the improvement of efficacy so that the
pregnancies and deliveries so fervently desired can occur in a manner
consistent with the ethical and legal norms of consent and informed
choice. Policies that improve safety and efficacy, increase access, cre-
ate a legal infrastructure, and regulate to protect the parties will thus
make the infertility journey less perilous and more efficient.
Will the increasing use of ARTs to form families change the
shape or conception of the family? Rather than undermining or alter-
52. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Lori Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal
Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REv. 2343, 2372-74
(1995).
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ing traditional conceptions of the family, the demand for ARTs com-
ports with the prevailing family paradigm of couples having and
rearing biologically related offspring. Despite their differences from
coital conception, ARTs support traditional notions of family by en-
abling a (usually married) couple to have and rear children who have
a genetic or gestational tie to one or both of the rearing partners. The
need for reproductive assistance may increase the costs of procreation
and may even require new legal infrastructure and regulation, but it
has little impact on the structure, shape, or meaning of the family as it
is traditionally understood.53
The aspect of ARTs that seems most threatening or challenging
to traditional conceptions of the family is the use of donors and surro-
gates to obtain children for rearing. The absence of legal infrastruc-
ture and regulation may well affect the family experiences that
infertile couples and collaborators using these techniques have. But it
is much less clear that the use of donors and surrogates, even when
done with respect for the rights and needs of all parties, will affect or
change our conception of family.
My impression is that these practices, though they result in fami-
lies in which a gamete source or even a gestating mother is absent,
pose little threat to the traditional understanding of the family. This
lack of impact should not be surprising for two reasons. One is that
couples use these techniques to replicate the coitally conceived family
as closely as possible. The second is that all of the techniques resem-
ble coital conception more closely than adoption does. Yet adoption
occurs much more frequently and has long been assimilated into our
understandings of the family.
ARTs using donors and surrogates differ importantly from adop-
tion in that they enable a biologic tie to exist between the infertile
couple and resulting child. In gestational surrogacy, for example, both
rearing partners provide genes to offspring, but lack the female gesta-
tional relation. In egg donation, both partners have a biologic rela-
tion, with only the female genetic connection missing. In embryo
donation, the rearing woman gestates but neither she nor her partner
have a genetic connection with the offspring. In sperm donation, the
woman both gestates and provides genes, and her partner has no bio-
logic connection at all.
53. This is not to deny that a new source of power is created in persons who control
this process as gatekeepers and providers of services, nor that new questions of social jus-
tice in the distribution of reproductive opportunities arise.
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I do not mean to trivialize the challenges that ARTs using donors
and surrogates pose for families. The donor or surrogate needs pro-
tection from exploitation and injury. Rearing rights and duties must
be clarified. The question of informing children of the details of their
conception or birth must also be faced. In short, a new set of repro-
ductive roles and relationships will arise, with unique demands,
problems, and stresses that need attention.
Yet the overall effect on the shape and conception of family is
likely to be small. Although of crucial importance for the participants,
the number of children born through gamete donation and surrogacy
will always be small.54 Moreover, the intention of the parties will be,
in almost all cases, to replicate the rearing relations of the coitally
conceived model of family, with the donor or surrogate usually ex-
cluded from any rearing role or acknowledgment. The variations on
family that ARTS make possible are simply incorporated into the
dominant model of the family that pervades our culture.
Some persons, however, might argue that the freedom to create
and define families in the novel ways made possible by ARTs will lead
to other ways of creating families that will ultimately hurt traditional
notions of family. In considering the possible effect that the freedom
to use donors and surrogates to form families could have on concep-
tions of the family, three kinds of freedom in fashioning families
should be distinguished. One form of such freedom is the previously
discussed use of a donor or surrogate to provide a missing genetic or
gestational component, with the collaborator having no rearing role at
all-the model that most persons using donors and surrogates now
adopt. As noted, the use of a third party raises issues of identity, rear-
ing rights and duties, and protection of collaborators. But the free-
dom to create a family in this way presents no threat to traditional
notions of family, because these actions occur within the prevailing
paradigm of the family as a couple raising offspring together.55 The
third-party collaborator is physically absent, and his or her existence
may not even be disclosed to the child.
54. It is unlikely that more than 35,000 of the two million children born in the United
States each year are born as a result of medical assistance. Of those born with medical
assistance, donor sperm probably accounts for most of them, estimated to be 20,000-30,000
a year. IVF, frozen embryos, donor egg, donor embryo, and gestational surrogacy proba-
bly account for 5,000-6,000 births at most. See Society for Assisted Reproduction, supra
note 3.
55. Depending on the technique used, the child may or may not be the actual "off-
spring" of the rearing couple.
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A second kind of freedom in forming families would arise if the
parties using collaborative ARTs agreed among themselves to share
rearing in an ongoing way, thus constituting a new, extended form of
family. For example, suppose the sperm or egg donor, the embryo
donors, or the gestational carrier agreed with the recipients that all
would play an active rearing or visitation role with the child. Imagine
a new grouping or type of family that involves open cohabitation or
open rearing by all participants in collaborative reproduction. Would
not such arrangements challenge the norms of reproduction,
parenthood, and family as we now understand them?
In fact, very few persons using donors and surrogates opt for such
an arrangement. While donor sperm is usually used anonymously, the
use of donor eggs and gestational surrogacy often includes a meeting
between the couple and the donor and surrogate beforehand. In some
instances there has been ongoing contact with the donor or surrogate.
Indeed, in some cases the same donor or surrogate has collaborated in
producing a second child with the same couple.
But even when the parties are open about collaborator identity
and allow ongoing contact with the child, their practice is still far short
of a joint living or rearing arrangement. Even when the donor or sur-
rogate is a sibling or parent, the recipient couple is still usually the
primary custodian and cohabitant of the child. It seems unlikely that
this pattern will change in the next few decades, even though claims of
reproductive and associational freedom would support enforcing such
alternative agreements. 56 Although some couples and collaborators
might embark on joint living or rearing arrangements, their number is
likely to be so small that their impact on traditional understandings or
conceptions of the family would be negligible.57 At worst, such ar-
rangements would present an alternate but rarely used way in which
persons could group together to produce or rear offspring-a high-
tech variation on a communal pattern of creating and rearing
offspring.
The most radical effect that the freedom to use donors and surro-
gates could have on traditional understandings of the family would
result from a reevaluation of the law of adoption. Consider, for exam-
56. I have argued that such agreements should be enforced. See ROBERTSON, supra
note 6, at 132-34. As Alta Charo has pointed out, just as you can never be too thin or too
rich, you can never have too many parents. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three... or
Four, or Five: Defining the Family after the Reprotech Revolution, TEX. J. WOMEN & L.,
Spring 1994, at 265, 306.
57. Such arrangements would be a very small part of an already minor part of annual
reproduction. See supra note 54.
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ple, how the use of donors and surrogates to form biologically related
families could extend to situations in which there is no biologic con-
nection between the rearing parents and the offspring. For example,
imagine a couple who very much want to have a child to rear, but are
unconcerned about having, or are unable to have, a genetic or gesta-
tional connection. As a result of the shortage of babies for adoption,
the couple hires a woman who is impregnated with donor sperm (a
case of full surrogacy exists if the male partner provides the sperm), or
alternatively, they hire a woman to gestate a donated embryo or an
embryo created from separate egg and sperm donations, and the wo-
man agrees to relinquish the child at birth.58
Since such arrangements amount to agreements to conceive or
carry a child who will then be relinquished to the commissioning
party, they present a direct challenge to the current system of nonen-
forcement of preconception or prenatal agreements to adopt. The
theory of procreative liberty that undergirds the use of ARTs would
not directly protect such arrangements, because the commissioning
party is not procreating, and indeed, has no biologic connection at all
with the child provided to them for rearing.59 This would be true even
if the commissioning couple or individual orchestrated the entire pro-
duction, and thus was a but-for cause of the child's birth.
Could one not argue, however, that the interest in rearing chil-
dren is as important as the protected interest in reproduction? In-
deed, recognition of the right to use donors and surrogates devalues to
some extent the need for all rearing partners to have a biologic tie
with the child, and thus supports the use of the parties' preconception
intent as the determining factor in any later legal dispute. If so, the
ideal of procreative liberty would then loop back to affect our law and
understandings of adoption, and greatly affect the existing regulatory
schemes for adoption. The effect would be that the state could regu-
late the process of entering into and implementing such arrangements,
but could not ban them altogether. Under this approach a single per-
son could gather together the gametic and gestational factors neces-
sary to produce the child that he or she would then rear alone.60
58. This analysis tracks a discussion in Children of Choice, Chapter 6, entitled "The
Loop Back to Adoption." See ROBERTSON, supra note 6, at 142-44.
59. Actions and agreements to obtain a child for rearing are not themselves procrea-
tive, even though they serve interests that might have their own independent importance.
See id. at 22-23.
60. The preconception agreements among the parties would control subsequent rear-
ing. See John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 353, 363-66 (1990).
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Whether the loop back to adoption occurs will depend upon
emerging understandings and valuations of the importance of rearing
children per se, and the relative weight given to genetic and nonbio-
logic ties in the production and rearing of offspring. While I am
doubtful that the law will quickly move that far, if it does, it would not
necessarily have a major effect on the shape or understanding of
family.
The main effect would be to expand the number of adoptions by
leading to a group of women (not unlike full surrogates) who are paid
to play that partial reproductive role. It would also lead to children
being raised by parents with whom they have no biologic tie, as now
occurs with traditional adoption. Special psychological problems
might arise for such children (who, strictly speaking, are not harmed
because they have no other way to be born but into such arrange-
ments), and protection for the women who bear these children would
be needed. Yet it is difficult to see how such arrangements would
have any greater effect on the traditional conceptions of the family
than adoption does. Unless these arrangements led to joint living or
rearing situations among all the participants, they would simply be an-
other way to create an adoptive family. Such arrangements would
have little effect on the concept of family beyond that which now ex-
ists with adoption.
Although ARTs are unlikely to affect or change prevailing no-
tions of family, they can nevertheless be seen as part of a larger set of
developments affecting the autonomy of individuals to shape families
and childrearing units to their needs. ARTs are part of a growing ar-
ray of social practices that redefine and restructure traditional fami-
lies, as do blended families, stepparent adoptions, and similar
practices. The resulting families are defined both by biology and by
intentional interactions. The question of the extent to which society
should permit, encourage, discourage, or recognize these new forms of
intimacy or family, some of which become childrearing units, is a ma-
jor ongoing social issue now being played out on many fronts.
Although ARTs do not directly affect the shape or meaning of
the traditional family, they do remind us of the importance to individ-
uals and couples of having a sphere of intimacy and privacy in such
matters. Questions about ARTs help us see the importance of inti-
mate concerns, and show us that biology is less important than we may
have realized (though paradoxically ARTs use and rely on biologic
connection for their popularity). Freedom to use these techniques
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thus implicitly supports the freedom of same-sex couples to marry and
to have and rear offspring.
If the principle of autonomy that underlies the use of ARTs is
applied to other situations of associational intimacy, the rights of gays
and lesbians to marry and to have and rear children should also be
recognized. Both involve individual choices about fundamental
human relations that define and give meaning to life. The right to
create and express intimate associations reflected in assisted repro-
duction provides grounds for supporting same-sex marriage in addi-
tion to the equal protection grounds in Baehr v. Lewin,61 the Hawaii
same-sex marriage case. It also provides grounds for recognizing the
intent of the parties in gay partnerships concerning the birth and rear-
ing of offspring. The New York Court of Appeals achieved this result
when it held in In re Jacob62 that the statute specifying who may adopt
included the same-sex partner of a biologic mother, thus removing the
barrier to same-sex rearing that its earlier decision in Alison D. v. Vir-
ginia M.63 had created. Extending to same-sex reproduction and chil-
drearing the principle of intentionality that drives our system of
gamete donation and gestational surrogacy would have reached the
same result more directly.
In sum, although ARTs pose no revolutionary threat to the shape
or understanding of family, they do remind us of how important fam-
ily is to human flourishing, and hence the need for tolerance of differ-
ent ways of forming or defining families. Opponents of same-sex
marriage should reexamine their position in light of ART practices,
for the respect for intimacy and meaning reflected in social acceptance
of ARTs should extend to gay marriages as well. At the same time,
ARTs proponents should listen to the concerns of critics, so they may
improve the provision of assisted reproductive services.64
61. 852 P.2d 44, 63-68 (Haw. 1993).
62. 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995).
63. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399-400 (citing Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27,
29 (N.Y. 1991)). Chief Judge Judith Kaye, who dissented in Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30,
wrote the majority opinion in Jacob.
64. Regulatory attention to how men and women actually use and experience ARTs
connects with insights and arguments that feminism has brought to bear on the debate.
Although liberal, cultural, radical, and socialist feminists disagree about the desirability of
ARTs, they all focus attention on the actual experience of women undergoing these proce-
dures by asking how these practices affect the actual lives and experiences of women. Ask-
ing "the woman question" about ARTs has thus helped focus attention on the problems
ARTs pose for donors, surrogates, couples, and offspring in practice.
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